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THE INDEPENDENT AGENCY-A NEW SCAPEGOAT
REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMIISSION. By Marver H. Bern-
stein. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955. Pp. xi, 306. $5.00.
THE Independent Regulatory Commission is under heavy attack. The offense
is being led by non-lawyers, among whom are Professor Marver S. Bernstein
of Princeton and Professor Horace M. Gray of the University of Illinois.' The
Independent Commission has, as a matter of fact, been the bate noire of political
scientists for many years, 2 but the present attack is more comprehensive, more
circumstantial and more effective. The independent agency has on the other
hand been the darling of the lawyer,3 but some of them are beginning to be
fickle.4 There can be no question in my mind that a re-evaluation of the role of
the independent agency is indicated.5 I think it is clear, as Professor Bern-
stein's book demonstrates, that the case for the independent agency has been
grossly overstated. But the present attack goes far beyond deflation. It makes
the agencies a scapegoat. The battle against them is being fought with slogans:
"industry-oriented," "politically irresponsible," etc. Lawyers shouted "Hos-
anna" in 1938 and saw the Promised Land revealed by Joseph ("Moses")
Eastman. Now it is the turn of the Jeremiahs: the Promised Land has become
a place of abominations. The agencies have betrayed reform and abandoned
decency. Perhaps it is inevitable that Thought and History should move in
this violently dialectic fashion, swinging from illusion to disillusion, from battle-
cry to battlecry, from slogan to slogan. These oscillatory lunges may be neces-
1. Professors Bernstein and Gray appeared recently before the Cellar Sub-committee
of the House Judiciary Committee to testify on H.R. 9762, which was designed to amend
the Sherman Act "to declare the primacy of free enterprise" by submitting regulated in-
dustries to a greater measure of control. Their remarks are reported in Traffic World,
March 10, 1956, p. 76.
2. As for example in the famous report of the PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINIS-
TRATIVE MANAGEMENT, ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES 39-40 (1937).
3. They we'e thus given a clean bill by a Task Force of the first Hoover Commission
which was composed of two lawyers. THE COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF TEE Ex-
EcUTivE BRANcH OF THE GOVERNMENT, TAsK FORCE REPORT ON REGULATORY COMIISSIONS
(1949) (hereinafter cited as TAsK FORCE REPORT).
4. A notable example is Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated
Industries: An Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 67 HARv. L. REV. 436, 464-71 (1954).
My own comments on Professor Schwartz' article appear in Jaffe, The Effective Limits
of the Administrative Process: A Reevaluation, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1134 (1954) and
Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction Reconsidered. The Anti-Trust Laws, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 577
(1954).
5. I have attempted this in a general way in Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Ad-
mlnistratlve Process: A Reevaluation, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1954).
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sary to unsettle the vast mass of social inertia; but I think that we academicians
should deal somewhat more subtly, more justly if you will, with causes and
effects, with the description and evaluation of social consequence, and finally,
with judgment.
Americans are a people not notably endowed with the historic sense. They
are given to enthusiasm, and that is good because enthusiasm moves mountains.
But enthusiasts are prone to violent disillusion: mountains are sometimes stub-
born, and even when they yield the view on the other side may be displeasing.
Although certainly exaggerated, the hopes set upon administrative agencies and
particularly independent agencies were more completely realized than anyone
had a right to expect, and it is just this which is part of the trouble. We find
ourselves with vaguely felt and undefinable challenges. We are miserably bereft
of a program for reform. The independent agency, ironically enough, is a
microcosm of our present prosperous predicament-liking not what we see, we
attribute our malaise to "industry-orientation" or some other half truth.
The constitutional basis for the independent agency is unsatisfactory. In
Humphrey's Executor," the Court speaking of the Federal Trade Commission
says,
"To the extent that it exercises any executive function-as distinguished
from executive power in the Constitutional sense-it does so in the dis-
charge and effectuation of its quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial power, or
as an agency of the legislative or judicial departments of the government.
"The fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the three general de-
partments of government entirely free from the control of coercive in-
fluence, direct or indirect, of either of the others, has often been
stressed .... "1
Mr. Justice Sutherland is here using the two analogies of court and legislature.
The court analogy is an apt and sufficient one when applied to the Tax Court,
Court of Claims, etc. Under Crowell v. Benson 8 the Supreme Court held that
Congress might endow the so-called legislative courts or agencies with judicial
business, and that not all such business need be given to the "Constitutional"
courts established under Article III. In aid of the power thus allowed to Con-
gress, Humphrey's Case permits Congress to protect such courts from execu-
tive domination, a condition which in our tradition is necessary and proper for
the effective exercise of judicial power. But the analogy of the agency to the
legislature, its characterization as an "agency" of the legislature, is baffling and
contradictory. In so far as such an agency is carrying out or "executing" a
congressional mandate, it would seem to be performing precisely that function
which the Constitution assigns to the Executive. It surely is not a premise of
the Constitution that the execution of a law must for its proper exercise be
independent of presidential control.
6. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
7. Id. at 628, 629.
8. 285 U.S.22 (1932).
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The campaign by the political scientists against the independent agency has
proceeded on both constitutional and political grounds. The Constitution, it is
argued, requires that all executive functions be subject to presidential control.
The President's Committee on Administrative Management somewhat rashly,
but picturesquely, called the independent agency "the headless fourth branch.",
They were forthwith accused by lawyers of conceptualism. 10 Lawyers have
been partial to these agencies. Liberal lawyers until their current disillusion
believed that reforms could be more effectively realized outside of politics. In
the fruitfully naive view of that era, "expertness" was envisaged as an objective
force which if left to itself would inevitably produce reform. Conservative
lawyers preferred the independent agency because it emphasized judicialization.
This they hoped would act, if not at once at least in time, as a brake on power.
And all lawyers could find common ground for their preference in the value
set on formally rationalized action and on continuity." But the autonomy of
"expertness" as an objective determinant of policy is, I am afraid, an illusion.
Policy-making is politics. Policy should, to be sure, be fairly and decently
made; it should have continuity and dependability. But nothing that I have
seen shows that these criteria are less honored and observed in executive
agencies, at least when they are required by statute to observe procedural pro-
tections.
1 2
The present attack goes much beyond the merely formal constitutional argu-
ment. It starts from a premise which we must all recognize: these agencies
exercise policy making powers much broader than those which are the inevitable
concomitant of judicial power. The exercise of policy making power, the argu-
ment continues, should not be independent of political control. As Professor
Bernstein points out:
"'[T]aking things out of politics' means 'taking things out of popular
control. This is a frequent device of special-interest groups to effect the
transfer of governmental power away from the large public to the special-
interest small public.'-13
Power, therefore, should be exercised by either the legislature or the constitu-
tional executive. The independent agency is criticized not only because it is
politically irresponsible, but because from the total body of policy powers, most
of which are committed to the President, it arbitrarily abstracts a segment and
thereby impedes policy coordination. 14
9. PRESIDENT'S COMmITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, op. cit. supra note 2,
at 40.
10. "Such apotheosizing obscures rather than clarifies thought." LANDIS, THE AD-
MINISTRATIVE PROCESS 4, 47 (1938).
11. The lawyers' position is well stated by the TASK FORCE REPORT 19.
12. The TASK FORCE REPORT in invoking for the independent agency the values of fair-
ness, continuity, etc., makes no comparison with executive agencies.
13. P. 73, quoting APPLEBY, POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION 162 (1949).
14. The TASK FORCE REPORT 25-28, found no significant evidence of lack of coordina-
tion with other agencies of government. But such evidence of hostility has been accumulat-
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In reply to this argument, lawyers have maintained that the notion of presi-
dential coordination is a myth. No man or organization representing him is
capable of coordinating the multifarious conflicts entrusted to government reso-
lution. A certain amount of unresolved conflict is inevitable, perhaps valuable.
It attests to the fundamentally indeterminate, pluralistic character of our com-
plex system. Though these things may be true, they do not seem to me to be
an adequate answer. The question is not of complete coordination, but of the
availability of the power to coordinate policy in a given area at a given time.
The practical difficulties of coordination hardly warrant, except for strong and
well-considered reasons, the creation of additional obstacles. It would seem to
me, therefore, that at least in the future Congress should hesitate to set up
further foci of independent policy-making power. Where the adjudicatory ele-
ment is predominant, independence may be required or warranted. But this, as
has been argued,' 5 may be a reason for stripping such an agency of as many
of its executive and policy-making powers as is consistent with an adequate
solution of the problem which the agency is being created to deal with.
The political argument is based on an attempt to document the charge that
the independent agency, having no duly constituted master, is falling under the
domination of private interests, characteristically the interests whose activities
it is supposed to regulate. This is the so-called phenomenon of the industry-
oriented agency. It should be noted that striking illustrations of this sort of
thing have not been wanting in the past. The cry against it has sometimes come
even from what might be called the other side of the fence. The National Labor
Relations Board was accused, and it is impossible to deny that there was some
justification to the accusation, of being partial to the labor unions. No doubt
the present critics would argue that the bias is more appropriate in that case,
since it operates in the direction of the reforming purpose of the statute. Be
that as it may, it is at this point that I begin to part company with the critics.
First, industry representation is not peculiar to the agencies. It is to my mind
not a little curious that the critics limit their examination of this phenomenon
to the independent agency. I would suppose that it was necessary first to estab-
lish the executive agencies as the norm and then to show how the independent
agencies tend to depart from that norm. Yet anyone who follows the activities
of the Department of Agriculture, for example, comes to feel (though this too
is no doubt an exaggeration) that the Department is a glorified farmer's
lobby.'0 An examination of the milk licensing activities suggests the enormous
ing since then, for example, between the regulatory agencies and the Department of Justice
on antitrust matters, and between the ICC and Agriculture.
15. See Professor Bernard Schwartz' review of Professor Bernstein's book. Schwartz,
Book Review, 69 HARv. L. REv. 960 (1956).
16. For example, the Secretary of Agriculture seems to attack on principle every hold-
ing of the ICC that disadvantages the farmers. The Department apparently adopts quite
frankly the view that it is a farmer's lobby. In hearings on a redefinition of the agricul-
tural commodity exemption the following statement was made by the Department's repre-
sentative:
"We know of no farmer or farm organization asking for or supporting these pro-
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power of the farm cooperatives.' 7 It is certainly not my thesis that all depart-
ments, nor for that matter all independent agencies, are industry-oriented; but
the current demonstration with respect to the independent agency is neither
scientific nor scrupulous.
The distortion in the attack goes much deeper. As I see it the critics' real
quarrel, if they would but recognize and admit it, is with Congress. The Inter-
state Commerce Commission, so much used as an example, is attacked for pro-
ceeding along the lines of its congressional mandate and at the same time for
failing to create a mandate which neither Congress nor anyone else has been
able to formulate.' 8 The Commission is criticized for being "railroad minded"
and monopolistic. But can anyone find in the legislation of 1935 and 1940 an
intention to establish competition as the presumptive norm of transportation
regulation? Joseph Eastman, the intellectual godfather of that legislation, in-
sisted that "free-for-all competition has never worked successfully, either here
or elsewhere. It has been tried and found wanting." "Constructive coordina-
tion" is to be preferred to "destructive competition." The ICC is "to find the
work which each form of transportation can do best and endeavor to build up
a national transportation system in which the various agencies will function
with more regard to correlation and less to competition and with a minimum of
waste."' 9 Everyone seems to be agreed that the railroads and the large truckers
were the dominant forces in procuring that legislation. Was this in the name of
competition? When somewhat later the Supreme Court came close to holding
that railroad rate conferences were a violation of the antitrust laws,20 Congress
immediately immunized them.2 1 Was this another indication of a congressional
mandate for competition? The ICC is, it seems to me, at times more tender of
the railroad interest than even a fair reading of its mandate would require, and
it may be less adventurous in permitting new competition than it might be. But
posed restrictions on agricultural hauling. In opposing this legislation, we believe
we are reflecting the views of the entire agricultural community. Instead of diminu-
tion or practical elimination of the present exemptions, the farmer and fisherman
would be better served by their expansion."
Hugh M. Nicholson, Traffic and Management Division, Production and Marketing Ad-
ministration, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, testifying before a Senate Committee. Hearings
Before the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on Bills Relative to
Domestic Land and Water Transportation, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., at 442 (1952). It is in-
deed arguable that the Department has been directed by Congress to act as an official
farmer's lobby. See 60 STAT. 1087, 1088 (1946), 7 U.S.C. 1621(3), 1922(j) (1952).
17. Cf. Brannan v. Stark, 342 U.S. 451 (1952); Note, Compensation of Diary Co-
operatives in the Federal Milk Marketing Areas, 65 HARv. L. REv. 328 (1951).
18. See Huntington, The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, The Railroads, and
the Public Interest, 61 YALE L.J. 467 (1952) ; I have commented on this in Jaffe, The
Effective Limits of the Administrative Process: A Reevaluation, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1105
(1954).
19. Regulation of Transportation Agencies, S. Doc. No. 152, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 4
(1934).
20. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
21. See the Reed-Bulwinkle Act, 62 STAT. 472 (1948), 49 U.S.C. § 5(b) (1952).
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these are minor choices in the operation of a scheme in which the major policy
directives are fairly clear. The railroads are after all the backbone of the trans-
portation system, and there are tremendous economic and social advantages in
using their facilities to the limit of their capacity. Any scheme based on the
notion of finding "the work which each form of transportation can do best"
must recognize this as a central fact.
On the other hand, the record indicates that the ICC has liberally authorized
a vast increase in trucking facilities. The statistics show that the rate of growth
in common carrier trucking has enormously exceeded that in railroading.22 It
is indeed arguable that trucks have been permitted to take traffic from the rail-
roads, even though our highways are overburdened and rail transportation is
less expensive. Under the jurisprudence of the ICC the doctrine of protecting
established "shares" of the traffic is now working as much in favor of the trucks
as of the railroads. This kind of policy may be as doubtful as you please, but it
is hard to see how an agency with a mandate to "coordinate" can fail to arrive
at some such doctrine.
The greatest weakness of the critics, to my mind, is that they have failed to
face honestly and wholeheartedly the most serious difficulty facing regulation
today. That difficulty is the radical lack of a meaningful statutory policy in
many of the areas where the independent agencies function. In some cases the
policy has become obsolete. The coordination theory of the 1930's, for example,
was based on the economic defeatism of that era. It was assumed that our
economy had become static, and that therefore the economic problem was one
primarily of allocating resources. Eastman was prepared to find what each
means of transportation could do best, as if that were a discoverable quantity
in a static world. Yet the tremendously dynamic character of our economic
system has substantially altered most of the traditional premises for resolving
the transportation problem. The constant engineering changes, the break up
of old monopolistic situations because of new modes of carriage, the tremendous
increase in freights-all of these raise questions both as to the desirability and
feasibility of close regulation.
In radio the situation is somewhat different, for there never has been a
statutory policy. The FCC was simply told to go ahead and regulate in "the
public interest." I have studied for some years the attempts of the Commission
to deal, in the absence of a congressional or popular mandate, with ,the baffling
and manifold complexities in that field. The Commission has lacked foresight,
has often been timid and has sometimes been subservient, but to my mind this
is the result of the absence of congressional guidance. I conclude that it is
much easier to criticize than to come up with an administrative program that
could command support. It was long ago pointed out by Herbert Croly, as
22. Taking 1939 as a base of 100, the 1954 revenues of steam railway stood at 239.7,
of motor property-carriers at 598.0, of motor passenger-carriers at 331.9, and the total na-
tional income at 411.9. "Transportation Economics" for January prepared by ICC Bureau
of Transport Economics and Statistics, reported in Traffic World, January 28, 1956, p. 76.
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Professor Bernstein reminds us, 23 that regulation creates a basic problem be-
cause it divides the responsibility for management. The gist of the difficulty,
as I see it, is that the regulator accepts no responsibility for the ultimate suc-
cess of the enterprise, yet his interference discourages entrepreneurial initiative
and diminishes the sense of responsibility. If the regulator is given a clear
mandate to remove a perceived evil, he has an adequate and limited basis for
validating his interference with management, and management has a basis for
calculating the effects of the interference. But in the absence of a clear man-
date, it is not only inevitable, but appropriate that regulation take the form of
an accommodation in which industry is the senior partner. This is the essence
of "industry-orientation."
There is very little in our history, I think, to indicate that an executive
agency will be much different from an independent agency in periods when
public opinion or statutory policy is slack, indeterminate, or lacking in convic-
tion. The odds are that it will respond in much the same way to the climate of
opinion. The history of the antitrust division of the Department of justice,
for example, is one of alternation between strict and loose enforcement of the
antitrust laws. The Federal Trade Commission, an independent agency, goes
through similar oscillations. The Civil Aeronautics Board in the course of its
very short history has shown an almost incredible flexibility in moving toward
and away from competition. It is, I think, demonstrable that when a new re-
form is to be undertaken, an independent agency may provide a hard hitting,
single-minded authority, oblivious to the immediate partisan requirements of
the Administration. The Labor Board proved this up to the hilt. In time, the
immediate problem solved, the agency loses its zest and settles into routine.
What institution does not? It may be a shade easier at this later stage to infuse
the executive agency with a new spirit, for in the absence of an adequate con-
gressional mandate, there is perhaps a better chance that the executive will be
able to evolve and gain support for a fresh approach. But if one has a "set" in
favor of vigorous regulation, it is pretty much a matter of chance whether he
will find it in executive or independent agencies. My arguments, of course, do
not make a case for the independent agency. As I have already indicated, it
seems to me sounder on balance that these policy-making agencies should be
subject to presidential control. Rather, these arguments are intended to show
that the critics of the agencies have attributed to the factor of agency indepen-
dence all sorts of political ills and disappointments for which it bears no re-
sponsibility whatever.
Now Professor Bernstein, as a matter of fact, "sees" all this, but in my
opinion he refuses to face its implications. He quotes from Merle Fainsod's
study to the effect that regulation requires "the existence of a social and eco-
nomic environment in which regulators can function without meeting frustra-




"The basic task of a regulatory agency is to fulfill the mandate of its enabling
legislation and design a program to promote the public interest." 25 "Public
understanding of the goals of regulation and public support for basic regula-
tory policies are essential to effective regulation of economic affairs. '2 6 1 gather
furthermore from his book that he would agree that there is today neither a
popular support nor a congressional mandate with respect to many of the areas
in question. How, then, can he insist that the "independence" of the agencies
is the root of the trouble ?
An underlying assumption of his thinking must first be brought to light. Tt
might be thought that the absence of a formulated policy of regulation testifies
to the absence of a felt need for regulation or of need for change in the existing
regulation; or it could be said to point to a period of search in which the public
is feeling its way to a new formulation. Professor Bernstein has a much more
strenuous and heroic concept of government. He apparently assumes that there
must always be "regulation" (at least of anything that has up to now been the
subject of regulation), and that regulation must always be of a certain character.
Obviously, therefore, the lack of any generally felt need is not particularly
significant: a government worth its salt should always be up and doing. If in-
dustry is "dynamic," regulation must be "dynamic. '27 It is this assumption of
the constant need for some vigorous type of regulation which leads him finally
to his conclusion. His basic argument is that it is not possible to rely on the
public or Congress or the independent agency to produce a continuous supply
of this sort of regulation. "Because of the complexity of regulation and the
reluctance or inability of Congress to clarify regulatory goals, a regulatory
agency must play the creative role of formulating major regulatory policies."23
Because the agencies have become committed to the status quo they will not
undertake this role. "Without pressure from the president, Congress is unlikely
to undertake progressive reform of regulatory policy."'29
I would agree with Professor Bernstein that we cannot look to the agencies
for new thinking. In the early stages of its history while still engaged in deal-
ing with the specific problem ("the evil") that brought it into being, the inde-
pendent agency can be relied upon to fight for a program in and out of Con-
gress. But once it has reduced the urgency of the problem and has, as it were,
created its own world, it is apt to become a defender of the status quo. It looks
upon its work and finds it good. We must therefore look elsewhere for new
policy-to the President, to one of the executive departments, to Congress and
its committees. The independent agency may even throw its force against the
presidential initiative and provide leadership for the status quo. This picture,
however, is one that is rarely realized in such simplicity. The ICC today is
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not by the railroads to whose interest it is supposed to be so slavishly devoted.
The Presidential Advisory Committee on Transport Policy has proposed legis-
lation which the railroads favor and the trucks oppose. It is difficult to deter-
mine whether the President has thrown his effective support in any direction.
The fact is that because the questions involved are so profoundly complex and
difficult, because public and professional perplexity is so intense, and the oppos-
ing forces are so violently aroused, it is quite misleading to lay the blame for
failure at any one door. Indeed, the inability to produce a new policy at will
is not, in my book, ipso facto a failure, though it would seem to be in Professor
Bernstein's.
One may, then, follow Professor Bernstein's argument that the merits of
the independent agency have been exaggerated. But when he loads upon it all
of the frustrations of his Utopian yearning, he is transcending analysis and
providing himself with a sacrificial scapegoat.
Louis L. JAFFEt
A COMMON LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CIVIL LAw. By F. H. Lawson. Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan, 1955. Pp. xix, 238. $4.00.
EXECUTIVE DISCRETION AND JUDICIAL CONTROL. AN ASPECT OF THE FRENCH
CONSEIL D'ETAT. By C. J. Hamson. London: Stevens and Sons, Ltd.,
1954. Pp. x, 222. 12s 6d.
Two recent books by English authors attest to the keen post-war interest
in the United Kingdom in the teaching and research of comparative law. The
authors, Professors Lawson and Hamson, hold the Chairs of Comparative Law
at Oxford and at Cambridge respectively. Professor Lawson originally pre-
sented his essays as the Thomas M. Cooley Lectures (Fifth Series) at the Uni-
versity of Michigan; Professor Hamson's work represents the sixth annual
group of lectures delivered in the United Kingdom under the terms of the
Hamlyn Trust.
The Hamlyn Trust furnishes a convenient starting point for the present
review. The terms for the administration of the trust provide for a lecture
series "to the intent that the Common People of the United Kingdom may
realise the privileges which in law and custom they enjoy in comparison with
other European Peoples."'- Yet, despite this admonition, Professor Hamson's
lectures under the Hamlyn Trust are unmarred by any smug, a priori assump-
tion of the superiority of English law to alien systems; nor, for that matter, do
Professor Lawson's essays involve such an assumption. Therein lies the par-
ticular interest and significance of the two works. Neither book is an attempt
to explore hitherto undiscovered source materials or to break new ground from
tProfessor of Law, Harvard Law School.
1. EXECUTIVE DIscRETioN AND JUDICIAL CONTROL ix.
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